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Introduction
 Most research has clariﬁ ed that, at the beginning of the 20th century, the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereafter the HSBC) was the largest 
British international bank in Asia.1) Shizuya Nishimura discussed some of the bank’s 
activities in Asia, but many activities at the branch and agency levels require further 
explanation.2) Fortunately, archival documents held by the HSBC Group Archives in 
London were organized and promptly made available to researchers. Shizuya 
Nishimura analysed the archival documents that were made public and consolidated 
his ﬁ ndings based on their content.
 The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Co., Ltd was established through the HSBC 
regulation in 1865. Under the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Ordinance (No. 5 of 
1866), the name was changed to ‘Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation’. The 
advance into Japan began right after the bank’s establishment in the same year, 
when a branch oﬃ  ce was established in Yokohama. The Kobe, Osaka, and Nagasaki 
branches were established thereafter, and they played a major role in Japan’s foreign 
trade ﬁ nancing operations during the Meiji era. This paper focuses on the Nagasaki 
branch.3)
 Nagasaki played a central role as the only port to have been opened to the West; 
 1） Research on the HSBC includes investigations into the representatives of British capital in China. For 
example, Tomoo Matsuda (1949, Chapter 2) pointed out that, in China during the latter part of the 19th 
century, the HSBC stood at the pinnacle with trading capital underneath and industrial capital at the very 
bottom, thus forming a three-layer structure with trading capital fulﬁ lling a deﬁ ned and important role. 
Moreover, Matsuda pointed out that, though the HSBC dealt in long-term loans as its primary business in 
the commercial ﬁ nance area, Jardine, Matheson and Co., together with the British and Chinese Corporation, 
were organized to fulﬁ l the role of intermediaries for the export of capital to China from Britain. However, 
archival documents have recently been made available to the public, and research using secondary docu-
ments has been drastically revised.
 2） Shizuya Nishimura (1993, 2014) conducted a wealth of research in this area. Here, we look only at his 
representative research on the Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation.
 3) As well known, the HSBC had roughly two kinds of branch statuses, branch and agency. In this paper, 
we use only branch without making distinctions among the two statuses.
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this was whittled away by the growing importance of Yokohama and Kobe during 
the Meiji period. However, Nagasaki retained its importance as a trading port for 
the overseas export of products from Kyushu in the Meiji period. At the same time, 
it also fulﬁ lled an important role in terms of its trade with the Korean peninsula, 
which acted as an intermediary with China (Ishikawa, 2016, Chapter 2). For the 
HSBC, the biggest factor inﬂ uencing the establishment of a branch in Nagasaki was 
its trade with the Korean peninsula.
 The only primary source of knowledge regarding the activities of the HSBC in 
Nagasaki from the latter half of the 19th century until the beginning of the 20th is 
an Inspector’s Report submitted in 1914 that is stored in the HSBC Archives. Our 
analysis of these data was presented in another paper. In this paper, we describe 
the activities of the HSBC’s Nagasaki branch and oﬀ er a plat-form of researches with 
the HSBC’s primary source, with a preliminary consideration for understanding its 
activities in Nagasaki.
Chapter 1 An Overview of the HSBC
Section 1 The Beginnings of the HSBC
 The beginning of the HSBC’s rapid expansion can be traced to the bankruptcy 
and suspension of payments of the Oriental Bank Corporation (hereafter the Oriental 
Bank) in 1884. The Oriental Bank was a British international bank in Asia that 
advanced into Japan with the opening of the country’s ports. It was responsible for 
Japanese government ﬁ nancial transactions with the outside world at the beginning 
of the Meiji period. The HSBC was able to build a stable position amid the ﬁ nancing 
operation vacuum created by the Oriental Bank’s collapse in Asia.
 After the 1870s, however, the global economy fell into the deep and long-term 
depression. Because the economies of Europe and the US were weaker, most mono-
culture economies in Asia were stagnated. As a result of Masayoshi Matsukata’s 
deﬂ ationary policies, Japan also found itself in an unavoidable short-term recession. 
In addition, the depreciation in the London silver market that began in 1873 continued 
unabated, with British banks in most parts of Asia̶including India and China, which 
were on the silver standard̶ﬁ nding themselves compelled to reduce their business 
activities. Furthermore, French and German banks were established in Asia (mainly 
in China). Japan witnessed the establishment of the Yokohama Specie Bank, with 
ﬁ erce competition ﬂ aring up between international banks seeking to gain foreign 
trade ﬁ nancing operation business in Asia. All these factors contributed to the 
HSBC’s sluggish business during this period.
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 The ﬁ gures indicate that, in 1890, the HSBC’s total assets were £25.6 million 
and the total asset proﬁ t ratio was 1.78%; in 1893, however, its total assets fell and 
the total asset proﬁ t ratio fell to £15.1 million and 1.66%, respectively. Thereafter, 
its performance improved. In 1913, its total assets stood at £39.9 million and the 
total asset proﬁ t ratio at 1.55% (Nishimura, 2007, p. 23). Moreover, after the end of 
the Sino-Japanese war, the HSBC played very important role for the war reparations 
payed by China to Japan at London and to issue railway construction bonds not only 
in China but also in the other Asian countries. In addition, the HSBC also played 
very important role to issue Japan national bonds, Tokyo municipal bonds, and other 
forms of debt, as the lead manager of European and Japanese international banks. 
Thus, the HSBC’s business before the First World War is summarized rapid progress 
during the 1880s, stagnated during the 1890s, and recovered at the beginning of the 
20th century (Nishimura, 2007, p. 23).
 As the head oﬃ  ce was located in Hong Kong, the costs of gathering information 
in Asia were decreased. This was also a major factor in the HSBC’s rapid progress 
in the short term. In terms of human networks, London branch oﬃ  ce managers A.M. 
Townsend and Sir C.S. Addis were very knowledgeable about the state of aﬀ airs in 
East Asia, while E.G. Hillier, who served as the branch manager at the Beijing oﬃ  ce 
for over 35 years until 1926, was highly proﬁ cient in Chinese. Taking advantage of 
his language ability, he established personal connections with important government 
oﬃ  cials during this time (King, 1983). The deep knowledge of the economy and 
culture of Asian locales and the intimate relationship with the system of government 
in these regions became a powerful asset unique to the HSBC.
Section 2  Price Depreciation in the London Silver Market and New 
Business Opportunities for the HSBC
 As mentioned, the London silver market suddenly began to confuse in 1873. The 
average price of silver from 1893 to 1895 was 31.95 pence. The parity between gold 
and silver was roughly 30 standards of silver for one unit of gold. These ﬁ gures 
represent roughly half of the standards in the middle of the 19th century. The average 
price of silver from 1911 to 1913 was 26.7 pence, with the gold-to-silver parity at 35 
(Spalding, 1924, p. 330‒31)
 The major factors in this sudden collapse in the price of silver at the London 
silver market included the transition from bimetallism to the gold standard in various 
Latin European countries that formed a monetary union, as well as the rapid increase 
in silver production due to the discovery of new mines in the US state of Nevada. 
However, these factors are secondary to the implementation of the extraction of 
12
silver from zinc, lead and other base metal ores (Carpenter & Cullis, 1920, pp. 
699‒759). In 1912, the silver produced using this method accounted for about 65% of 
total production worldwide. The US and Canada alone constituted 80% of the total 
silver produced using this method. In other words, with the advent of industrializa-
tion, the demand for base metals spiked, and it became diﬃ  cult to control their 
output. It was thus diﬃ  cult to stabilize the chaos in the parity between gold and 
silver through adjustments in silver output. As a result, the output of silver, which 
was diﬃ  cult to regulate, increased threefold over its 1870s rate (Shirras, 1919, p. 451).
 During the latter half of the 19th century, the serious ﬂ uctuation in the London 
silver market inﬂ icted serious damage on international bank’s activities in Asian 
Countries and Colonies which were mainly adopted to silver standard. Many inter-
national banks, including the Oriental Bank, were forced to be suspended its 
payments. The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China (hereafter the 
Chartered Bank) began giving directions to sell the silver assets of each branch that 
were in excess of its liabilities, buy British pounds, and remit them to the London 
headquarters. The HSBC basically used the same method, referred to as the ‘even 
keel policy’ (Spalding, 1912; Kitabayashi, 1992).
 Moreover, the HSBC collected deposits at its Asian branches, especially in China 
and Hong Kong, the amount of deposits collected in Asia was much larger than other 
international banks. Beginning in 1895, silver local currency deposits and British 
pound deposits were diﬀ erentiated and recorded on balance sheets. With regard to 
other currencies, gold and silver currencies were recorded separately. We cannot 
analyse the balance sheets of the HSBC in chronological order because many of its 
documents were lost. However, the balance sheets of the Chartered Bank can be 
analysed. If we compare the Chartered Bank’s ﬁ gures in the periods for which we 
have HSBC ﬁ gures, we ﬁ nd that the HSBC’s deposit amounts were almost 10 times 
greater than those of the Chartered Bank. Generally, the HSBC is believed to have 
maintained an overwhelming presence in Asia (Nishimura, 2007, p. 27).
Section 3. The HSBC’s Fundamental Business
 The HSBC’s core business consisted basically of selling remittance bills on 
London in exchange for local currency, used to purchase ﬁ xed-date bills of exchange 
on London in pound sterling as collateral for exported goods. Most of these remit-
tance bills were transferred via telegraph. Money exchange proﬁ ts, which constituted 
the most important source of earnings for international banks, were made when the 
market price of the acceptance credits fell along with interest rates.
 Furthermore, in this period, Asia had a specialized primary product export 
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economy that played an important role within the international division of labour. As 
many Asian economies were primarily agrarian, seasonal factors aﬀ ected their 
capital requirements. Thus, during busy agricultural periods, exports increased, 
which in turn led to an increase in the British pound export bill sales, causing the 
market for the British pound to decline. On the other hand, during oﬀ  periods, export 
bill sales fell, causing the market for the British pound to rise. Accordingly, to trade 
export bills, those who could utilize the diﬀ erences in the market for the British 
pound during the two seasons could gain stable annual proﬁ ts. With few internal 
documents remaining, the question of how the HSBC traded export bills cannot be 
elucidated. It is generally believed that proﬁ ts were made in a similar manner.
 Besides this business of making proﬁ ts on currency exchanges, many interna-
tional banks in Asia made proﬁ ts from loans given to customers. Although the earn-
ings of the international banks were not particularly great, it was an indispensable 
ﬁ nancial service for their trader clients. In particular, the lending of capital was 
needed for inventories until the capital and contracts for the sale of imported prod-
ucts and the collection of export product cargo were established.4) This service helped 
ensure the buying and selling of promissory notes.
 In addition to securing appropriate collateral, the lending of capital necessary for 
the collection of the export cargo occurred chieﬂ y via methods that involved estab-
lishing an accounts for overdrafts. Furthermore, when lending capital necessary for 
safekeeping in warehouses until contracts were created for the exported products, 
articles kept as collateral were warehoused and often used against these loans. As 
mentioned, any necessary capital was collected as local currencies-dominated deposit. 
Collecting methods involving ﬁ xed deposits were particularly popular. Hence, inter-
national banks, including the HSBC, tapped earnings using the diﬀ erence in interest 
rates between the ﬁ xed deposit and the capital which was lent out.
 In this way, international banks active in Asia were making proﬁ ts. Among these 
banks, the HSBC was especially active in spreading its roots and developing business 
in East Asia. A signiﬁ cant factor in making this possible was undoubtedly the head 
oﬃ  ce’s location in Hong Kong. In the business of international banks during this time, 
large and complex cases were often referred to the head oﬃ  ce. As a result, branch 
managers of international banks other than the HSBC had little choice but to check 
with the European head oﬃ  ces each time such an event occurred. Moreover, using 
 4） Looking at Indian cases from the 1920s, when Toyo Cotton Co. entered raw cotton production areas to 
purchase the product directly, it is clear that the Yokohama Specie Bank, in particular, oﬀ ered this service 
(Kagotani, 2000, Chapter 4). Moreover, at the branch manager meetings of Mitsui Trading Company, it 
became clear that the Yokohama Specie Bank along with the HSBC had provided the same service 
(Nishimura 2012; Takeshi Nishimura 2014).
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the telegraph to discuss such issues was very expensive, and thus impossible. 
Therefore, the only way to inquire about such matters was via letter (Kaukiainen, 
2001). According to Farnie (1968, p. 451), letters sent between China and Europe took 
37.5 days one way in 1889 and 29 days in 1893, whereas the time it took for the 
HSBC to send letters between the head oﬃ  ce in Hong Kong and branch oﬃ  ces in 
Japan, the Chinese mainland, Southeast Asia, or South Asia was extremely short. 
The HSBC was consequently able to make prompt administrative decisions, which 
contributed greatly to its successful collection of large deposits.
Section 4. Issuing of Foreign Loans by China and the HSBC
 From the latter half of the 19th century, the HSBC developed close relationships 
with China’s central and regional governments.5) Thus, the business of lending capital 
to China’s governments was conducted on a scale unmatched by any other interna-
tional bank. During this period, the HSBC took part in about 65% of all capital 
borrowed by the China’s goverments from overseas. Moreover, roughly 20% of the 
HSBC’s total earnings were foreign loans issued by China's governments. The HSBC 
had not yet begun to monopolize China’s foreign loan issuance business; thus, there 
was no room for other international banks.
 However, when Japan won the ﬁ rst Sino-Japanese War, China was forced to pay 
reparations that were far larger than the annual revenue of its central government, 
thus compelling the issuance of foreign debt. Naturally, the HSBC planned to claim 
this great business opportunity as its own, but it was snatched away by the Russo-
Chinese Bank,6) an international bank created with capital from France and Russia 
(Yago, 2012; Yago, 2014). Thereafter, the Russo-Chinese Bank began to openly 
compete with the HSBC in diﬀ erent ﬁ elds. Due to these failures, the HSBC entered 
into an agreement with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and planned the issuance of 
foreign loans in accordance with the reparations to be paid by China. Thus, with 
several international banks forming a syndicate, the HSBC experienced diﬃ  culty in 
monopolizing the issuance of foreign loans in Asia, especially in China, at the begin-
ning of the 20th century.
 5） According to the HSBC’s Inspector’s Report, during this time, most depositors at the Beijing and Tianjin 
branch oﬃ  ces were government agencies and important government oﬃ  cials, while those at the Shanghai 
branch consisted mostly of European traders and businesses (Shizuya Nishimura 2014).
 6） Following the ﬁ rst Sino-Japanese War, Russia and China entered into a secret pact. In a fundraising eﬀ ort 
by the Russo-Chinese Bank, the Russian government itself issued four hundred million francs worth of 
government-guaranteed bonds in France and Paris (Nishimura, 2007, p. 30).
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Section 5. The HSBC and Nagasaki
 As a result of the transportation and communications revolution in the second 
half of the 19th century, the frontiers of various parts of the world opened up, and 
commodities ﬂ owed into the global market at an unprecedented rate. Thus, commodity 
prices suddenly fell, wreaking havoc on the Asian countries that relied on exporting 
commodities to advanced countries. In addition, due to the sudden plunge in the 
London silver market, foreign exchange risk increased, causing many international 
banks’ activities in Asia to suﬀ er an administrative crisis, with some banks actually 
failing. During this period, Asia proved to be very important for international banks. 
It was in this environment that the HSBC came to display its peculiar organizational 
traits and superiority, thereby growing to become the largest international bank in 
Asia.
 After the Meiji restoration, under the new government’s economic policies, Japan 
dealt with a growing proactive foreign trade̶especially in the export of raw silk, 
which played an important role. The export of raw silk played a key role in inaugu-
rating research on Japan’s trade history. Thus, it has been thoroughly examined and 
does not require further discussion. Furthermore, the raw silk exports ﬁ nancing 
operations in Yokohama became the principal issue in Japan’s economic history. 
However, while the foreign trade ﬁ nancing operations for accompanying the export 
of raw silk were major businesses for the international banks in Yokohama, Kobe, 
with its harbour opened to Asia, had a trade structure based on modern manufac-
turing industries, which needed the import of raw materials like Indian raw cotton 
and the export of processed goods like cotton yarn and cotton thread to the Chinese 
mainland and the Korean peninsula. The features of the trade ﬁ nancing operations, 
which have become empirically clearer over the last several years, were diﬀ erent 
from that of Yokohama (Takashi Nishimura 2014). Many issues remain in the 
research on Japan’s trade history.
 As mentioned above, although Nagasaki had lost their overwhelming sense of 
superiority, she managed to remain the leading trade ports in Japan during the Meiji 
period. In particular, the relationship with the Korean peninsula was unique. The 
following chapter describes a part of the local economy of the northern part of 
Kyusyu, with a focus on Nagasaki’s trade structure, and discusses the management 
of the HSBC’s Nagasaki branch.
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Chapter 2.  A General Outline of Trade in Nagasaki during the Meiji 
Period
Section 1. Trends in Trade in Nagasaki
 Japan’s prosperous trade with the Netherlands, which was once permitted in 
Nagasaki, began to decline after the Meiji Restoration, with Yokohama and Kobe 
taking over as major ports for overseas trade. Most studies on the history of foreign 
trade during the Meiji period focus on the raw silk trade. Regarding business rela-
tionships between domestic and foreign trading companies, European and American 
trading companies were assumed to have good relationships with Japanese merchants. 
Hence, subjects like the opening of ports during the end of the Edo period and the 
decline in trade in Nagasaki have often been neglected. The actual business transac-
tions of these domestic and overseas merchants in Nagasaki are not fully known.
 At the end of the Edo period, the opening of the port at Yokohama became an 
area of European inﬂ uence dealing almost exclusively with the raw silk trade. The 
overseas trade by Chinese merchants during the ﬁ nal years of the Edo period 
continued during the Meiji period, when Japanese merchants were not yet proactively 
involved in direct trade, either domestic or overseas. Moreover, a wealth of research 
has established that Japan’s foreign trade was carried out by European and American 
trading companies (merchants) or their compradors, like Chinese merchants. Unlike 
in Yokohama and Kobe, Chinese merchants played a major role in the other principal 
trade port of the Meiji period̶Nagasaki.
 Let us look at the changes in foreign trade. According to Annual Return of the 
Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan, the early years of trade in Nagasaki were 
Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan, each years 
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Figure 1: Trends in Foreign Trade of Nagasaki Prefectureduring the Meiji Period
(Source) Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan, each year.
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favourable until 1893, when imports increased excessively (see Figure 1).7) Thereafter, 
the gap between exports and imports suddenly expanded, and the ﬁ nal years of the 
Meiji period saw imports grow three times the size of exports.
 Observing Nagasaki’s export organization during the Meiji period (see Table 1), 
the high ratio of special exports is apparent. The ﬁ gures were especially high in 
1908, when they constituted around 58% of gross exports. The special exports in 
this period consisted of a large proportion of fuel (mostly coal), food, and other 
articles for foreign vessels and domestic as well as foreign ships. In 1910, fuel coal 
comprised about 94% of special exports.8) This high rate of special exports reﬂ ects 
the slump in normal exports, thus revealing the special characteristics9) of Nagasaki’s 
trade structure during the Meiji period (Nagasaki prefecture, 1976, pp. 450‒451).
Table 1: Composition of Nagasaki’s exports during the Meiji period
(¥ 000)
Year 1888 1898 1908
Exports Food 2,418 1,636 1,473
Textiles 17 286 95
Processed goods 494 340 267
Ores, metals, and 
machinery 1,029 931 756
Sundry goods 220 391 702
Total 4,177 3,585 3,293
Re-exportation 151 882 424
Special exports 1,297 2,120 5,067
Total 5,625 6,587 8,783
(Source) Nagasaki prefecture (1976), Nagasaki-ken-shi: Kindai-hen (History of Nagasaki Prefecture: A 
Modern Compilation), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobundo, p. 453.
 7） According to Hiroki Uchida (2007, pp. 33‒34), Nagasaki had an excess of imports in 1884. Uchida believes 
that the diﬀ erence in the ﬁ gures was caused by the use of the numerical values from the Nagasaki 
Prefecture Statistical Reports. Suﬃ  cient research has not yet been conducted on the reasons for the exis-
tence of these diﬀ erences with Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan.
 8） For Shanghai, Hong Kong, and the Straits Settlements, coal produced by the Takashima, Miike, and 
Chikuho Coalmines competed with and was isolated from the coal produced in Cardiﬀ  and Australia, and 
uniform shares were rapidly and successfully acquired by Asian coal markets. Shinya Sugiyama (1989, p. 
210) points out that the success of these coal imports was the beginning of the switchover from a European 
and American style to an Asian style of foreign trade. Regarding business conditions for coal produced in 
Japan for Shanghai and Hong Kong and the role of Mitsui Trading Co., please see the research by Naoto 
Yamashita.
 9） The Search Report on Important Commodities from Each Prefecture indicated that the national position 
of the trade port at Nagasaki was reduced to one of local importance. However, Nagasaki’s foreign trade 
structure was limited to a special existence that consisted of 1) special trade for warships stopping at 
ports; 2) the trade of marine products and coal; 3) Mitsubishi’s import of raw materials for building ships 
and heavy industries; 4) intermediary trade within Kyushu; and 5) essential intermediary trade between 
foreign countries and overseas territories. The eﬀ ect of these trades to local industries in Nagasaki was 
extremely weak (Nagasaki prefecture, 1976, pp. 442‒444).
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Section 2.  Changing Transportation Methods: From Sea to Land 
Transport
 The large impact of changes in the transportation system on the industrial struc-
ture can be observed in the transition from maritime to land transport. As goods 
were directly transported from the production areas to the harbour via railways in 
Kyushu’s coal industry, considerable changes in distribution may have occurred there-
after. However, prior to the opening of the railroads, ships represented the main form 
of transportation linking production areas to harbours. The capacity of the ships 
entering Nagasaki was overwhelmingly large compared to the other major ports of 
Kyushu at the time (Nakamura, 2003, p. 53). Although, with the dawn of the Meiji 
period, the position of Japan’s major trade ports continued to decline, the position of 
the harbours that collected and distributed products within Kyushu was still strong.
 The products exported by ship that entered the ports of Nagasaki during the 
Meiji period consisted mainly of coal, rice, camphor, and other similar products. These 
ports did not merely play a role in the shipping of coal and rice; they also played a 
huge role in continuously collecting and delivering products from the northern part 
of Kyushu during the ﬁ nal years of the Edo period (Nakamura, 2003, p. 56). From 
the end of the Edo period until the beginning of the Meiji period, Nagasaki continued 
to maintain the core harbour function of coastal trade developed in the northern 
part of Kyushu. It is believed that its position as ‘the Nagasaki as Kyushu’ trade port’ 
was more important for Japan than overseas trade.10)
 Thereafter, railways continued to be established across the country, including 
Nagasaki, as land transport, mainly rail transport, surpassed maritime transport in 
linking the diﬀ erent regions of the country. In the case of Nagasaki, the main produc-
tion areas for coal at the beginning of the Meiji era were the neighbouring coalmines, 
including the Takashima coalmines, which gradually lost their position to the Miike 
and Chikuho coalmines (Ishi, 1986, p. 47). These areas were linked to Moji directly 
through the railways (Nakamura, 2003, pp. 72‒74), causing Nagasaki to quickly lose 
its position as a trade port. In other words, Nagasaki was not compatible with the 
changes that took place in the linking of major coalmines through the railways and 
thus quickly lost its position as an important trade port (Nakamura, 2003, pp. 59‒62).11)
 10） Refer to the research by Tojo (2014, pp. 97‒106) on the activities of Mitsubishi how the regular routes 
between Nagasaki and the domestic regions were formed from the end of the Edo period until the early 
Meiji period.
11） At the beginning of the Meiji period, Nagasaki witnessed the construction of the railroad, which did little 
to support the features of a trade port. Instead, discussions were held aimed at expanding the distribution 
of goods with Nagasaki and the surrounding prefectures (Tojo, 2014, pp. 107‒117).
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Section 3. Japanese and Foreign Merchants
 In the January 14, 1909 issue of the Toyo-Hinode-Shinbun, an article titled ‘The 
Transfer of Trading Rights’ insinuated that Japanese merchants had rapidly picked 
up the methods of the Chinese traders in Nagasaki. However, in the 1900s, around 
23.3% of Nagasaki’s exports comprised the direct trade conducted by Japanese 
merchants, while imports constituted more than 41.8%. In 1893, the percentage of 
the direct trade out of total exports was 10.9%, suggesting that Nagasaki’s foreign 
trade had rapidly shifted to Japanese merchants during this period (Uchida, 2007, p. 
41). Nevertheless, a large part of transactions was conducted by foreign merchants. 
In particular, the amount managed by Chinese merchants was large, comprising 
roughly 52% of Nagasaki’s exports in 1907.12) This percentage maintained around 40% 
at the beginning of the 20th century (Hara, 1991, p. 72).
 According to the ‘Register of Foreign Trade Merchants in Nagasaki Wards’, 
published in 1882, 226 merchants were managing trade operations in Nagasaki. 
These merchants made a living mainly by acting as domestic and foreign interme-
diaries for foreign products, collecting/brokering marine products and coal, and 
selling to overseas merchants (Uchida, 2007, p. 41). At the beginning of the Meiji 
period, merchants producing lacquerware and porcelain also participated in trade at 
Nagasaki.13) Although these Japanese traders continued to enjoy high social status 
throughout the Meiji period, there faced diﬃ  culties as they attempted to surpass 
foreign traders, particularly Chinese ones.
 Though European and American traders held important positions at the end of 
the Edo era, Chinese traders began to claw away at their status around the middle 
of the Meiji period. As a result, major European and American traders left Nagasaki. 
Thereafter, while the resident Chinese merchants built commercial networks and 
expanded their business in Nagasaki (Liao, 1997). To provide necessary ﬁ nancing to 
Chinese merchants residing in Japan, European banks established branches in Japan. 
The HSBC was one of the ﬁ rst banks to establish a branch in Nagasaki.
12） As regards marine product businesses, which make up most of Nagasaki’s exports during the Meiji period, 
Chinese merchants dominated this area (Uchida, 2007, p. 41). Please note that, at the end of the Meiji period, 
problems related to business methods occurred between Chinese and Japanese merchants. Eventually, the 
Japanese side gave in, and a settlement was reached. Given these experiences, Japanese merchants realized 
that much of Japan’s trade was highly dependent on the expansion of direct exports (Nagasaki prefecture, 
1976, pp. 391‒392; Nagasaki City, 1939, pp. 145‒147)
13） Research conducted by Minoru Kiyama (2005) clariﬁ ed the antagonism between trading companies and 
regional traders in Nagasaki in the Meiji period.
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Chapter 3.  A General Overview of Activity in the Nagasaki Branch of 
the HSBC
 Although prominent European merchants such as Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij, Glover & Co., Dent & Co., and Jardine, Matheson & Co. advanced into 
Nagasaki immediately after the ports were opened, there was a noticeable lack of 
signiﬁ cant foreign banks. As a result, prominent trading companies also operated 
ﬁ nancial businesses (Tatewaki, 1985, p. 239).14) International banks set up branches 
in Yokohama and Kobe even faster than in Nagasaki. While it is believed that this 
provided an opportunity to receive ﬁ nancial services from banks, trading companies 
in those days often conducted business using their own capital. The foreign trade 
ﬁ nancing operations by international banks seems to have occurred right around the 
middle of the Meiji period.
 As mentioned, the HSBC was established on March 3, 1865, as an international 
bank, with its head oﬃ  ce in Hong Kong, where it was positioned at the core of British 
merchants such as Dent & Co. and Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company. In the following month of that year, a branch was established in Shanghai, 
and another was established in Yokohama in July. In 1870, the network of branches 
was expanded to Kobe, and the HSBC began the businesses in Nagasaki in 1892.
 In Nagasaki, until the HSBC established a branch, agents were consigned to 
British trading companies or trustworthy British nationals residing in Nagasaki. The 
ﬁ rst was Glover Co., followed by Adrian & Co., Van Delden & Co., Jardine Matheson, 
and Browne & Co. (Tatewaki, 1985, p. 248).
 In the 1890s, international banks were set up in Nagasaki in succession. As 
regards British banks, the HSBC established a branch in 1896 and the Russo-Chinese 
Bank in 1897. The Russo-Chinese Bank had to close its branch as a result of the 
conﬂ ict between Russia and Japan in 1904, leaving the HSBC with its branch in 
Nagasaki, which closed during the Great Depression in 1932.
 In 1891, the HSBC dispatched A.B. Anderson to Nagasaki. The HSBC was 
renting a building from Browne Co., which had been serving as an agent for the 
HSBC. Later, in 1896, the HSBC ended its agent relationship with Browne Co. and 
established a branch in Nagasaki (King, 1988, p. 96).15)
14） See the research by Kanji Ishi (1984, pp. 145‒155) regarding ﬁ nancing immediately following the opening 
of operations of Jardine Matheson Holdings.
15） Kazuo Tatewaki (1985, p. 251) considered 1892 as the year the Nagasaki branch was opened, based on the 
January 13, 1892 issue of The Rising Sun and Nagasaki Express. According to the description in other 
studies on this time period, the question of which branch oﬃ  ce was to be established was a point of 
contention. Here, we will utilize the observations by F. H. H. King.
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 During that time in Nagasaki, regional private banks had already been estab-
lished, and, unlike the other principal trade ports in Yokohama and Kobe, the HSBC 
did not play a leading role in modern banking.16) According to the written history of 
the Eighteenth Bank Ltd., there were 10 banks in Nagasaki in July 1899, including 
the HSBC and the Russo-Chinese Bank. The Yokohama Specie Bank had established 
a branch to take care of trade ﬁ nancing operations for the direct trade (Eighteenth 
Bank Ltd., 1978, p. 59).
 Of the remaining seven banks, there was only one zaibatsu bank, Mitsui Bank, 
while the other six were regional banks. Among them, the Eighteenth Bank Ltd. had 
the most extensive business. In 1890, a branch oﬃ  ce was established in Incheon, 
while ﬁ nancing the marine products business in Nagasaki and the Korean peninsula 
(Eighteenth Bank Ltd., 1978 p. 106). Chinese merchants played a major role in trade 
with the Korean peninsula; aiming to establish a branch in Nagasaki, the HSBC’s 
business was also highly regarded (King, 1988, p. 96).
 There is very little information17) on the management of the Nagasaki branch 
from the end of the 19th century until it closed in 1932.18) According to the few 
written accounts of the management conditions during that time, the HSBC had few 
business relationships with Japanese merchants;19) most of their business partners 
were European/American or Chinese merchants. To supply foreign trade ﬁ nancing 
operations for these merchants was the most important business of the Nagasaki 
branch, while exchange trades and foreign ﬁ nancial transactions with companies and 
merchants in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and London and loans necessary for European/
American or Chinese merchants were not handled by the HSBC’s Nagasaki branch. 
Thereafter, during the world wars, Nagasaki lost the status of a foreign trade port, 
which slowed business and prompted the closure of the branch oﬃ  ces during the 
business recession caused by the Great Depression in Japan (The Eighteenth Bank 
16） Refer to materials compiled by Nagasaki prefecture and Nagasaki city regarding changes to banking within 
the Nagasaki city (Nagasaki city, 1939, pp. 178‒184; Nagasaki prefecture, 1976, pp. 399‒403).
17） With regard to items in the HSBC archives, primary sources related to the HSBC’s Nagasaki branch prior 
to the First World War are limited to the 1914 Inspector’s Report. As regards the Yokohama and Kobe 
branches, other letters and documents exchanged with the main branch remain, while further investigation 
is also needed to see if anything remains regarding the Nagasaki branch.
18） According to documents belonging to Nagasaki city, the branch closed in April of 1931, but here we use 
the date indicated by F.H.H. King (Nagasaki city, 1939, p. 184).
19） If we look at the income and expenditures of banks that established branches in Nagasaki in 1917 and 
compare them with the rest, the HSBC had no more than 0.75% of total deposits and 0.70% of total amount 
invested. In contrast, Yokohama Specie Bank, which carried out foreign exchange tasks similar to the 
HSBC, had 9.1% of total deposits and 9.2% of the total amount invested. The Yokohama Specie Bank was 
perceived as strengthening the relationship with traders who had set up positions within Nagasaki more 
than the HSBC. (Nagasaki City Elementary Staﬀ  Union, 1925, p. 398). Here, we present numerical values 
for ﬁ ve years beginning in1917. For the most part, no changes were noted in the percentages.
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Ltd., 1978, p. 299). After the closure of the branch, agent duties were conferred onto 
Holme Ringer & Co. (Burke-Gaﬀ ney, 2013, p. 152).
Future Topics
 We have discussed the HSBC’s activities in Nagasaki during the Meiji period with 
a focus on the conditions in Nagasaki that formed the backdrop to these activities 
for analysing its trade. During the Edo period, Nagasaki dominated trade with the 
West; during the Meiji period, Yokohama and Kobe assumed this role, reducing 
Nagasaki’s national presence to a local one. After the opening of the port at the end 
of the Edo period, many merchants, including Glover Co., created positions in 
Nagasaki to carry out their trading businesses, but many moved to Kobe and 
Yokohama during the Meiji period. With regard to banking, even with branches set 
up in Nagasaki, there were few businesses involving branch oﬃ  ces. The HSBC was 
the only bank to maintain a branch until the 1930s.
 Moreover, international bank’s activities in Yokohama and Kobe encouraged to 
accompany Japan’s overseas trade. Furthermore, the contributions made to the devel-
opment of the modern banking industry have been made evident through the 
previous studies of Japanese Financial History. On the other hand, in the case of 
Nagasaki, during the period in which the HSBC had established abranch, locally 
funded banks such as the Eighteenth Bank Ltd., which advanced into the market 
more slowly than the Mitsui Bank, had already been established. Moreover, with no 
administration to proactively increase business with Japanese traders, these banks 
continued their management activities with an emphasis on business with European/
American and overseas Chinese merchants. The management scope of the Nagasaki 
branch did not grow as rapidly as that of other ﬁ nancial institutions.
 International banks, including the HSBC, entered Nagasaki solely to participate 
in its trade-related ﬁ nance. In the case of the HSBC, similar to the Eighteenth Bank 
Ltd., major interest was expressed in trade with the Korean peninsula for marine 
products, thus leading to the establishment of the branch oﬃ  ces. Naturally, as so 
much interest was expressed in trade with the Chinese continent, particularly over-
seas Chinese merchants, there were no doubts regarding the strong relationship that 
the overseas Chinese network had with the HSBC and its expansion into Nagasaki. 
However, during the middle of the Meiji period, Nagasaki, with its ratio of foreign 
trade dwindling, was replaced by Kobe and Yokohama. There were plans take advan-
tage of Nagasaki’s own geographic superiority to expand foreign trade with the 
Chinese continent, but the textile and sundry goods industries developed in the 
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Osaka－Kobe area with Kobe’s rising importance as a port city exporting to the rest 
of Asia. Then, around the beginning of the 20th century, the ratio of Japan’s total 
foreign trade accruing to Nagasaki fell to less than 10%.
 Thus, Nagasaki, which was overshadowed by the development of Yokohama and 
Kobe near the areas of mass consumption such as Tokyo and Osaka, was not directly 
connected to major new coalmines such as the Miike or Chikuho coalmines. This is 
why Nagasaki lost its superiority as the port from where Japan’s major export goods 
were dispatched and foreign trade was conducted during the Meiji period. Then, why 
did the HSBC maintain the branch in Nagasaki for such a long period, and what is 
the source of operating proﬁ ts for HSBC’s Nagasaki branch? Other than the 
remaining portions of the Inspector’s Report submitted in 1914, no concrete evidence 
remains. However, by presupposing the circumstances surrounding the status of 
Nagasaki during the Meiji period, as explained in this manuscript, we believe that 
very little data have been exploited. Thus, we plan to analyse the administrative 
trends of the Nagasaki branch in next papers.
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